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**ANALYSIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK ON THE JUDGES**

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**ABSTRACT:**

The judiciary, which India received from the British sixty-seven years ago, is in desperate need of significant change. A swift trial is essential not only to provide prompt justice but also to maintain long-term trust in the court, for which the Government and the judiciary must collaborate. In India today, there is no effective process for disciplining a superior court judge, either for misbehavior under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution or for delinquent behavior necessitating inquiry and corrective action. Ironically, the higher judiciary in India has constitutional powers of control over all organs, but no effective means of disciplining its own members. If effective measures of punishing judges of the superior courts are not established, public confidence in the higher judiciary, which is currently high, may erode in the long run.<sup>1</sup> The problem of judicial accountability is concerning since there have never been so many judges under investigation for alleged acts of corruption. Judges are considered to be divine persons or guards of law. But when a law-maker becomes a law-breaker, there comes the need for accountability of judges. In this study, the research analyzes the lacuna over the matter of constitutional checks on the judges. The main objective of the study is to find out the problem and loopholes in the matter of accountability of the judges. Empirical research methods have been followed. Random sampling method with a total sample size of 236. The collection source of Data from public places in Chennai and the tool used by the researcher is SPSS.

**KEYWORDS:** Judiciary, Superior court, Accountability, Discipline, Delinquent behavior

**INTRODUCTION:**

One of the unique features of the Indian Constitution is that despite the adoption of a federal system and the existence of central and state laws in their respective fields, it generally provides for a single integrated court to administer both Union and State law.<sup>2</sup> At the top of the entire judicial system exists the Supreme Court of India, below which are the High Courts of each

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<sup>1</sup> Shivani Kumari, Right to privacy, blog.ipleaders, (Feb. 01, 2024, 4:19 PM), <https://blog.ipleaders.in/different-aspects-of-right-to-privacy-under-article-21/>,

<sup>2</sup> egyankosh, <https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/19139/1/Unit-25.pdf>, (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

state or group of states. Below the High Courts is the hierarchy of lower courts.<sup>3</sup> Panchayat courts also operate in several states adjudicating civil and criminal disputes of a local and minor nature. Different state laws prescribe different types of court jurisdiction. Each state is divided into judicial districts presided over by a District Judge and the Court, which is the primary civil court of first instance and can hear all crimes, including those convicted of crimes punishable by death. The trial judge is the highest judicial body in a district.<sup>4</sup> Below it are courts of civil jurisdiction, known in various states as Munsifs, SubJudges, Civil Judges, etc.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, the Criminal Justice Authority is composed of Principal Justices and Judges of the First and Second Class. The salient observational Report lists the tasks undertaken via way of means of the Court, e.g., the tasks to cope with the virtual divide inside the judiciary. Order Communication Portal allows the virtual sending of High Court orders to subordinate courts for that reason decreasing the time for the next action. The current framework on judicial accountability is the Constitution of India affords for the elimination of the judges of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts for misbehaviour and disability through impeachment.<sup>6</sup> The provisions of impeachment had been supplied inside Article 124(4) (SC Judge) and Article 217(1)(b) (HC Judge) of the Constitution.<sup>7</sup> To date, the most effective impeachment intended became initiated towards a Supreme Court decision however the manner failed. Similarly, no judge of the High Court has been impeached thus far. Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 became an authority to modify the research manner and to locate evidence displaying disability and misbehavior on the part of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Article 235 of the Constitution affords for the `control` of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary. It affords a powerful mechanism to put into effect the duty of the diminished judiciary. The most important challenge to judicial accountability is that the judiciary is an independent body and the independence of judges cannot be extinguished.<sup>8</sup> Any attempt to hold the judiciary accountable to the legislative or executive branch would leave it vulnerable to outside pressures. It is difficult to balance judicial accountability with judicial independence. There is no other way to remove a judge than by dismissal and the procedure is

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<sup>3</sup> sci, <https://www.sci.gov.in/>, (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

<sup>4</sup> successcds, <https://www.successcds.net/class-8/social-science/civics/important-questions/chapter-4-judiciary>, (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*, at 1457.

<sup>6</sup> forumias, <https://forumias.com/blog/judicial-accountability-in-india/>, (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

<sup>7</sup> INDIA CONST. art 124. Cl. 4 & 217. Cl. 1. B.

<sup>8</sup> iasbaba, <https://iasbaba.com/2022/11/need-for-judicial-accountability-and-judicial-independence-in-india/>, (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

long and complicated. For this reason, it is difficult to increase judicial accountability. Again, this process cannot be diluted as it would compromise the independence of the judiciary. In addition, SC and HC have contemptuous power to prevent anything from being imposed on the judiciary without their consent. The judicial body is the ultimate interpreting body of laws, policies, rules, etc., and can easily invalidate anything of his will. In India, the Supreme Court has been depicted as a custodian of the charter and additionally portrays the function of the father or mother of social revolution. It is similarly essential that the appointment of judges to such a group in addition to different better judicial authorities is obvious and the judicial officials appointed are accountable. The appointment of Judges in England and Wales is finished with the aid of the impartial Judicial Appointments Commission, which changed into shape in 2006. The very last veto withinside the appointment is with the Executive. Judges withinside the Canadian better judiciary are appointed and now no longer elected. The power of the Canadian Supreme Court is nine, along with the Chief Justice. Except for the choice of PM, Parliament has no function withinside the appointment of judges withinside the Supreme Court nor does it preserve any authority to study the hints made. The aim of the study is to determine the lacuna found in the Indian constitution with respect to the accountability of the judges.

#### **OBJECTIVES:**

1. To know about the origin and development of the judiciary forum.
2. To establish a lacuna found on the constitutional provision relevant with judges.
3. To analyze the challenges over judicial accountability.
4. To know the need to enhance Judicial Accountability.

#### **REVIEW OF LITERATURE:**

This paper deals with three issues in India and makes a comparative analysis of the judicial system described in the Indian Constitution regarding appointment, removal, and declaration of assets to the system UK, Canada, and USA, further dealing with the challenges the Indian judicial administration is facing pertaining to judicial accountability and transparency and

weeds out a list of problem present at the present system.<sup>9</sup> The author through this paper provides various recommendations through which these issues can be solved (**G. et al. 2019**). In this article, the author is trying to fill the scientific gap. Using the original dataset of 200 randomly selected cases between 2007 and 2014, we tested how these reforms changed the behavior of the judiciary. This result marks a significant collapse of the court's ideological position in 2010, recognizing a post-reform conservative ideological change that has grown in size over time. However, this shift has not yet had a statistically significant impact on court outcomes (**Varol, Pellegrini, and Garoupa 2017**). In this article, the author tests the extent to which decisions made by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court are predicted by illegal variables.<sup>10</sup> The result is that the norm is if authorities claim to be more unconstitutional than non-public parties, and if, even if they control a wide range of potential confounders. It indicates that it is likely to be overthrown by ECC. It is from the reported media. Given the case in Ecuador, they conclude that an officially strong ECC is very sensitive to government influences, even if the legal protection situation improves (**Castro-Montero and van Dijck 2017**). Legal scholars often suggest institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and sell judicial independence. The evaluation integrates literature, research on constitution-making, and research on judicial politics. The outcomes indicate that constitutional change is a considerable reason for judicial instability and courtroom docket manipulation, even after capability endogeneity has been taken into account (**Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2016**). This paper aims to re-evaluate the relationship between the independence of the law and the independence of the judiciary in practice using a new theory and an expanded data set. In view, institutional safeguards do not work in isolation but in combination, so specific combinations of protections are more likely to be effective than others. The Authors find that the rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the only de facto safeguards that actually

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<sup>9</sup> Ass. Prof. Anuradha Dhadge Girme, Judicial Accountability and Comparative Approach, 8, International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT), 889 - 892, 2019, <https://www.ijert.org/research/judicial-accountability-and-comparative-approach-IJERTV8IS070407.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> José Luis Castro-Montero & Gijs van Dijck (2017) Judicial Politics in Unconsolidated Democracies: An Empirical Analysis of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (2008–2016), Justice System Journal, 38:4, 380-398, DOI: 10.1080/0098261X.2017.1327336

strengthen judicial independence in practice, and they work together.<sup>11</sup> This effect is strongest in authoritarian regimes and in executive control contexts (**Melton and Ginsburg 2014**).<sup>12</sup>

This paper investigates why courts, through statutory interpretation, treat some important laws but not others, and why some laws are dealt with immediately after enactment while others are recorded on the books for many years before reaching the judicial authorities. Evidence shows that the conditions at the time of enactment, as well as the characteristics of the law, play an important role in determining whether and when a statute reaches the courts. In particular, the government is divided and disagreements between the two houses increase the likelihood that the courts will handle important legislation (**Maltzman et al. 2014**). Research on judicial independence suggests that the Supreme Court can be designed to act as an external control over political actors.<sup>13</sup> However, independence from political influence does not necessarily mean an incentive to use these forces. The authors point out that reforms have not led to an increase in the tendency to declare the law unconstitutional, and that legislative scrutiny is particularly relevant to unconstitutional decisions and unconstitutional individual court votes. increase (**Carroll and Tiede 2011**). The author in this article, develops a comparative theory of judicial role that focuses on broad differences in political context, and particularly in party systems, across countries.<sup>14</sup> The author's focus on the anti-democratic nature of judicial action assumes a robust constitutional culture outside the courts and a legislature that does a decent job representing popular will; both assumptions tend to be false in newer democracies (**Landau, n.d.,2010**).<sup>15</sup> The author considered constitutional judicial review of policy, the power of courts to annul legislation, as a political insurance mechanism to protect against losses from adverse election outcomes.<sup>16</sup> The article analyzes three questions: first, under what

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<sup>11</sup> Melton J, Ginsburg T. Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?: A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence. *Journal of Law and Courts*. 2014;2(2):187-217. doi:10.1086/676999

<sup>12</sup> James Douglas Melton, Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?, 2, *Journal of Law and Courts* 187-217, 2014, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271798911\\_Does\\_De\\_Jure\\_Judicial\\_Independence\\_Really\\_Matter](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271798911_Does_De_Jure_Judicial_Independence_Really_Matter)

<sup>13</sup> Peter Vondoepp, Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi and Zambia, 59, *Political Research Quarterly*, 389-399, 2006, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249802446\\_Politics\\_and\\_Judicial\\_Assertiveness\\_in\\_Emerging\\_Democracies\\_High\\_Court\\_Behavior\\_in\\_Malawi\\_and\\_Zambia](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249802446_Politics_and_Judicial_Assertiveness_in_Emerging_Democracies_High_Court_Behavior_in_Malawi_and_Zambia)

<sup>14</sup> [journals.law.harvard.edu](https://journals.law.harvard.edu), [https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/2010/08/issue\\_51-2\\_landau/](https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/2010/08/issue_51-2_landau/), (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).

<sup>15</sup> David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51, *Harvard International Law Journal*, 319- 378, 2010, <https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/558/>

<sup>16</sup> Stephenson, Matthew Caleb. "Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence." *Journal of Law Economics & Organization* 20 (2004): 379-399.

circumstances should a political leader, who wins an election and has the right to propose political measures, put these measures under the control of an authoritative independent judiciary under any circumstances. Second, the expected net gain of a political leader by giving binary options to the judicial authority under consideration instead of open options. Third, the balance of power considers the policy given to the judiciary (**Tridimas 2010**). Judicial oversight is an important control of government and legislature. In this paper, researchers use state-level data to test whether judiciary independence and constitutional rigor are associated with certain types of abuse of power by government officials. The authors found that states with high judiciary independence and a strict constitution generally have lower levels of per capita corruption than states with opposite characteristics (**Adriana S. Cordis, 2009**). The author introduces the ways in which the judiciary takes part in the resolution of social conflicts which deals with the organization and staffing of the Federal courts. This paper also examines judicial power in terms of access to power, instruments of power, the limitations of that power, and the distinctive methods that characterize judicial decision-making, as well as the proper functions of judges in a constitutional democracy (**Cordis 2009**).<sup>17</sup> The author examines the political origins of the four constitutional revolutions and shows that in many cases judicial empowerment is the result of a conscious strategy practiced by the political and economic classes that are marginalized. threatened to seek to maintain their hegemony in the face of the growing influence of peripheral groups in the crucial autocratic decisions production arena. In response to perceived threats from the periphery, elites with disproportionate access and influence in the legal arena often begin to vie for constitutional rights to prevent planning. policy from prevailing political pressure (**Hirschl 2000**). In this article the author deals with how to arrange for an independent judiciary, the authors derive some additional policy implications by drawing on two indicators of judicial independence recently introduced by them.<sup>18</sup> De facto had a highly significant impact on economic growth. (**Feld and Voigt, n.d., 2004**). This article examines, why Russian regions created their own constitutional courts and others did not, during the 1990s.<sup>19</sup> Contrary to current theories that assert that politicians create

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<sup>17</sup> W F Murphy; C H Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and Politics - An Introduction to the Judicial Process, Fourth Edition, ojp.gov, (Feb. 01, 2024, 4:19 PM), <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/courts-judges-and-politics-introduction-judicial-process-fourth>

<sup>18</sup> Carlo Guarneri, Judicial independence, independent judges and judicial power: a puzzle, academia, (Feb. 01, 2024, 4:19PM), file:///C:/Users/mishr/Downloads/Judicial\_independence\_independent\_judges.pdf

<sup>19</sup> Trochev, Alexei. "Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia." *Law & Society Review* 38, no. 3 (2004): 513–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555143>.

a strong and independent judiciary to protect them from the tyranny of election-winners in the context of political uncertainty, The analysis finds that constitutional courts emerged only in those regions where governors virtually guaranteed their re-election by consolidating their political power vis-a-vis federal and local governments (**Trochev 2004**).<sup>20</sup> Analysis shows that the official judiciary does not anticipate the announcement of a judicial review that will abolish all or part of the law. The results warn both scientists and institutional designers. Both formal and informal factors form the parameters operated by the court. In the post-Communist era, courts became a stronger system but faced various restrictions on independent behavior (**Herron and Randazzo 2003**).

The willful introduction of a judiciary able to check the energy of the president and the ruling PRI seems to counter political logic; however, it makes experience as a political “coverage policy” to shield the ruling celebration from its rivals. This article argues that the probability of the reforms generating an empowered judiciary will increase because the ruling celebration's opportunity of reelection declines (**Finkel 2005**). The concept of federal judicial independence is mostly confusing to political and constitutional theorists because it is fundamental to the proper functioning of our constitutional democracy.<sup>21</sup> Federal courts, thereby potentially affecting even explicitly granted independence to the judges of these courts. Thus, now it seems ripe to re-examine the constitutional and political scope of federal judicial independence (**Redish and Nagel 1990**). The author expresses the US Constitution and the pattern of the constitution which provides the federal judges to hold their offices only on good behavior and no one can be diminished during the continuance in office and further about impeachment clauses explicitly addressing the issues of judicial tenure, compensation, discipline, and removal (**Shane 1993**). The author traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy, and also examines the role of the judiciary. The discussion put forth will play a significant part in the current national debate on the role of the Supreme Court (**Wolfe 1985**).<sup>22</sup> The author provides a selective, comparative introduction to the judicial process through an analysis of the courts of

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<sup>20</sup> *Id.*, at 1462.

<sup>21</sup> Redish, Martin H., 'A Taxonomy of Judicial Independence', *Judicial Independence and the American Constitution: A Democratic Paradox* (Redwood City, CA, 2017; online edn, Stanford Scholarship Online, 18 May 2023), <https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804792905.003.0003>, accessed 24 May 2024.

<sup>22</sup> [https://books.google.co.in/books/about/The\\_Supreme\\_Court\\_and\\_Constitutional\\_Dem.html?id=cRJ7DQAAQB-AJ&redir\\_esc=y](https://books.google.co.in/books/about/The_Supreme_Court_and_Constitutional_Dem.html?id=cRJ7DQAAQB-AJ&redir_esc=y), (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).



the U.S. England, and France.<sup>23</sup> A discussion on courtroom docket staffing covers judicial selection, tenure, qualifications, and political impacts on judicial selection. Specific subjects tested regarding courts, courtrooms, and juries encompass trial and appellate courts, court docket procedure, the choice and impaneling of juries, and civil and criminal trial procedures, and the discussion on judicial review is presented in terms of American political history and thought, and limitations on judicial power and effectiveness are explored (**Rosenblum 1964**).<sup>24</sup>

#### **MATERIAL AND METHOD:**

The present paper utilized both essential and optional data. The essential data was gathered from the overall population. The very organized poll about the consciousness of issues identifying speculations of discipline flowed among the respondents. Type of research: doctrinal research and method of random sampling method. A total of 236 samples have been taken out of which are taken through random sampling. The sample frame taken by the researcher is an online source. Bar graph analysis has been done for analysis. Independent variables are Age, Gender, Occupation, and Qualification and Dependent variables rely on the questionnaire framed like responsible duties of the judges, absence of discipline measures, no effective step for controlling such discipline actions, scrutiny for allegations of corruption, effective step for accountability of judges.

#### **ANALYSIS :**


#### **INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:**

#### **FIGURE 1 - AGE**

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<sup>23</sup> Bryant G. Garth, *The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France*, *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, Volume 30, Issue 4, Autumn 1982, Pages 684–688, <https://doi.org/10.2307/840015>


<sup>24</sup> *Id.*, at 1463.



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 1, represents the age group distribution of the respondents.


**FIGURE 2 - GENDER**



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 2, represents the gender of the respondents.


**FIGURE 3 - MARITAL STATUS**



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 3, represents the marital status of the respondents.


**FIGURE 4 - QUALIFICATION**



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 4, represents the qualifications of the respondents.

**FIGURE 5 - OCCUPATION**




**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 5, represents the occupation of the respondents.

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE:**


**FIGURE 6 - Most responsible duties of the judges as a guard of law**



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 6, represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., most responsible duties of the judges.

**FIGURE 7 - Agreeability of no discipline in the organ of the judiciary.**




**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 7, represents the opinion of the respondents to the question I.e., the judiciary has the power to control all the organs but no discipline in its members.

**FIGURE 8 - Judges come under scrutiny for alleged act of corruption**


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**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 8, represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., Judges come under scrutiny for alleged acts of corruption.


**FIGURE 9 - There is no effective method for disciplining a judge for misconduct**



**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 9, represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., there is no effective method for disciplining a judge for misconduct.

**FIGURE 10 - The need for accountability of judges**




**LEGEND :**

The shown figure 10, represents the opinion of the respondents to the question of the need for accountability of judges when lawmakers become lawbreakers.

**COMPARISON CLUSTERED BAR GRAPHS**

**FIGURE 11**





**Most Responsible Duties Of Judges As A Guard Of Law**


**LEGEND :**

The clustered bar graph represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., the most responsible duties of the judges as a guard of law in comparison with gender.

**FIGURE 12**

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


**LEGEND :**

The clustered bar graph represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., judiciary power to control over all organs but no discipline in its members in comparison with age.



**FIGURE 13**




**LEGEND :**

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The shown clustered bar graph represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.eJudges come under scrutiny for alleged acts of corruption in comparison with gender.


**FIGURE 14**



**LEGEND :**

The shown clustered bar graph represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.e., there is no effective method for disciplining judges for misconduct in comparison with age.

**FIGURE 15**



**LEGEND :**

The shown clustered bar graph represents the opinion of the respondents for the question I.eThe need for accountability of judges comes when lawmakers become lawbreakers in comparison with gender.

**RESULT:**

In the above-shown graphs, The pie chart represents the responses from the age group category from 18 to 45 and above, with 2.1% from below 18 category as fewer responses and 53% from 26 to 35 category as more responses (Figure-1). The pie chart represents the responses from gender categories from all ages peoples, there are 62.7% from females 36.5% from males, and fewer responses from transgender (Figure 2). The pie chart represents the responses to the marital status of the respondents, 64% as married and 36% as Unmarried people (Figure 3). From the observation of the pie chart of the Qualification distribution, there are more respondents from UG people 38%, and fewer from illiterate people 1.27%(Figure-4). From the observation of the pie chart of the occupation outcome, there are 38% more respondents from the private sector people 38%, and 3.8% from the students as lesser in count(Figure-5). From the observation of the bar graph for the dependent variable, for the question on the most responsible duties of the judges - most of the respondents opined for the administration of justice 38% and fewer respondents must not be biased and prejudiced 13% (Figure-6). From the observation of the bar graph for the dependent variable, for the question on the judiciary without the effective method of discipline in the members, there are more respondents for the neutral option which is 32%, and fewer responses from 6% strongly disagree (Figure-7). From the observation of the bar graph for the dependent variable, for the question of whether judges come under scrutiny for alleged acts of corruption, most responses were 34% moderate, and responses from option 5.5% (Figure-8). From the observation of the bar graph for the dependent variable whether the public agrees with the statement on no effective method for disciplining a judge for misconduct, 76% people agreed and not agreed -23% (Figure-9). From the observation of the bar graph for the dependent variable, for the question on the need for accountability of judges when lawmakers become lawbreakers, most outcomes from neutral 26% and 10% less from the option strongly disagree(Figure-10). From the observation of the clustered bar graph in comparison with the question on the most responsible duties of judges as a guard of law and gender, most of the respondents belonging to the female group opted for the administration of justice option rather than the male respondents(Figure-11). From the observation of the clustered bar graph in comparison with qualification and the question on judiciary power to control over all organs but no discipline in its members, most of the respondents belonging to the UG opined for the neutral option and illiterate respondents are lesser in count (Figure-12). From the observation of the clustered bar graph in comparison with

gender and the question on whether judges come under scrutiny Ty for alleged acts of corruption, most of the respondents belonging to the female opined for the moderate option, and fewer responses from males (Figure-13). From the observation of the clustered bar graph in comparison with qualification and the question on the absence of an effective method for disciplining a judge for misconduct most of the respondents belonging to All sectors opined for the no option as a preferred and yes option lesser in count (Figure-14). From the observation of the clustered bar graph in comparison with marital status and the need for accountability of judges comes when lawmakers become lawbreakers, most of the respondents belonging to the married opted for the neutral option rather than the Unmarried people (Figure-15).

### **DISCUSSION:**

From the observation of empirical analysis from Figure 1 to 5 which deals with the independent variable I.e., age, gender, occupation, qualification, and marital status, as an overall view, the study indicates that there are more adult people respondents where the samples are collected from the public place with the simple random collection and the data shows that people are independent with an open mind. With respect to the dependent variable- In Figure 6, the public is in the stable option for the administration of justice because they just know the outlook of court performance. In Figure 7, the people are more or satisfied with the statement raised and agree that there is no effective implementation to control the discipline of the judges. In Figure 8, the public is too afraid to respond to the question of judges' acts of corruption. In Figure 9, the public often supports that there is no existence of effective steps for the discipline of judges for misconduct where there is a divine person. In Figure 10, the outcome from neutral indicates that people are unaware of the performance of the judges and they accept the judges' defaults and state the need for accountability. In Figure 11, people from gender distribution opined on the basis of general presumption without legal knowledge. figure 12, people prefer to say neutral this is because they are unaware of the judge act and judiciary role expected the legal practitioners. In Figure 13, people belonging to adults who have experienced this have an assumption that such judges also come under the alleged act of corruption but there is no measure. In Figure 14, the public is unable to answer this because there is no potential knowledge of the field of law among all the sector people other than a few law field members. In Figure 15, people prefer to say the need for accountability to have control and pressure on lawmakers.

**LIMITATIONS:**

The major limitation of the study is the sample frame. The sample frame is collected through an offline as well as online platform, when offline there is an option for choosing a particular area and reaching there on a certain date for receiving data. The public refused to answer the questionnaire at their convenience. Lack of knowledge for the common public over the legal research study, where it does not reach more among them, Thus it has drawbacks for the study. There is no proper solution for the problem faced by the public in the survey collection. The physical factors are not the most impactful but difficult to get responses and awareness should reach the public with a well-organised style.

**CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION:**

The judiciary has been given essential responsibilities to fulfill. Transparency and fairness are two important factors that must be applied by judges who represent the courts. To enhance citizens' trust in the judiciary, the judiciary needs a stronger and more developed accountability system to clarify decision-making. Several charges have been made against various Supreme Court and Supreme Court Justices as well as Chief Justices that they were biased in concluding a case. The only way to clear these charges is to make the judiciary more accountable to the public. Therefore, keeping to the facts discussed, issues raised and cases raised, the conclusion can be drawn that the country needs greater judicial accountability to bring about justice for all citizens of the country. The suggestion of the study is to redress the loophole that exists in the constitution and must seek out such issues in order to avoid collisions. The law must be more efficient over the judges who are considered a divine person and there is a need for accountability to render justice.

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